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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves three separate actions which are consolidated for purposes of 
judicial economy. The first action is a claim by Dale K. Barker Co. P.C. against John K. 
Bushnell for tax work performed for him personally. This action also encompasses the 
Counterclaim filed by Bushnell against the Company. The second action is a claim by 
Dale K. Barker Co. P.C. against Bushnet, Inc. for unpaid tax work performed on its 
behalf. Bushnet did not file any counterclaims. These two actions are the subject matter 
of this appeal. 
The final action is a Third Party Complaint filed by Bushnell against Dale K. 
Barker Jr. This action is the subject matter of a separate appeal, and consequently the 
issues surrounding it are not addressed here. 
In their brief Bushnell and Bushnet argue that the issues should be commingled. 
Their sole purported factual basis is that a payment of Bushnell's taxes appeared on a 
Bushnet bill. This ignores the fact that all of the work for the respective clients was listed 
out separately. It ignores the fact that, for tax purposes, the tax services performed for the 
business were fully deductible, whereas those performed for an individual are only 
partially deductible. It also ignores the fact that the claims are set forth separately and 
individually in the Complaint. It also ignores that there were two separate contracts 
entered one for Bushnell and one for Bushnet. Legally, the Defendants' position ignores 
the fact that, other than judicial economy there was no requirement that the claims be 
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brought in one action. Finally the argument fails because as a matter of law Bushnet, Inc. 
has a separate legal existence from Bushnell. 
Factually and legally the claims are distinct and must succeed or fail on their own 
merits. To merge the claims constitutes plain error. 
I. ISSUES AFFECTING BOTH CLAIMS 
A. MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In Section IV of their brief, Defendants cite to general standards regarding the 
Plaintiffs duty to marshal the evidence on appeal and then make a conclusory statement 
that Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence. This is done without citing to a single 
piece of evidence or legal argument supported by that evidence that Plaintiff has 
purportedly failed to raise. 
In its' brief the Plaintiff went well beyond the alleged marshaling made by the 
Defendants, and cited to additional parts of the record and addressed the legal issues 
raised by those facts. Plaintiff has included a record of the case including full transcripts 
of the trial and all trial exhibits and the transcripts of the post judgment hearings. There 
simply is no evidence that is part of this case that has not been included on appeal. 
Defendants' argument is therefore without merit. 
B. THE CONTRACTS WERE NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
In their brief, the Defendants spend the bulk of their argument claiming the 
contract between the parties was ambiguous and that accordingly the trial court was 
obligated to accept parole evidence to interpret its terms. Appellee Brief pgs. 19-33. In 
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Flores v. Earnshaw, 627 Utah Adv. Rep 13 (Utah App. 2009) the Utah Court of Appeals 
reviewed Utah law regarding alleged ambiguities in contracts. In Flores the Court stated: 
"[T]he first step should be to determine if the REPC is facially ambiguous, i.e., whether 
the contract language is susceptible to contrary tenable interpretations." Flores at 15. 
Defendants initially argue that the paragraph in the contract defining the scope of 
work to be performed was ambiguous. The stated scope of the work was set forth in 
paragraph 1 of the parties' contract. It states: 
1. Scope of Services. Barker agrees to perform the following services for Client, 
including such additional services related thereto which are reasonably required. 
(a.) All requested services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker 
either express, written, or/and implied. Also, the acceptance of all prior services 
and billings rendered by Barker. 
In Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 622 Utah Adv. Rep 31 (Utah 
2009) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to the language of 
the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. We 
also consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Where the language within the four 
comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from 
the plain meaning of the contractual language and the contract may be interpreted 
as a matter of law. 
Id., as cited in Flores at 14. 
The language of the contract is clear. The work to be performed is that requested 
by the client and understood by Barker. Defendants incorrectly state there was a dispute 
as to the scope of the work to be performed. It has never been disputed that the scope of 
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the work consisted of preparation of the past due tax returns, preparation of the currently 
due tax returns and negotiations with the IRS. Finding of Fact #8 (R.461) Conclusion of 
Law 43 (R.466). 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiff performed the requested services. It is also 
undisputed that the work performed by the Plaintiff was in accordance with the Rules of 
the AICPA. Because the language was clear, and in any event there is no dispute over 
what the scope of the work was, there is no ambiguity allowing the use of parole 
evidence to change the terms of the contract. 
The contract also established what the Company was to be paid for the services it 
was performing. Paragraph 2 of the contract states, in pertinent part: 
2. Fees. 
(a.) Rate. As compensation for all services (including Telephone Conferences) 
rendered by Barker pursuant to this agreement, Client shall pay to Barker on the 
terms and conditions contained herein; fees on a project by project basis... 
1 .Payment of Fees. 
(a.) Time. Barker shall issue periodic billing statements to Client on or about the 
first of each month. Client shall pay any and all fees due hereunder within fifteen 
(15) days of the date of each such billing statement. 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiff performed the work as agreed to under the Scope 
of Services paragraph. It is likewise undisputed that the monthly statements for those 
charges were sent to the Defendants, and that the statements indicated the amount being 
charged for the services. It is undisputed that until long after the Defendants had 
terminated Plaintiffs services, and hired the firm of Defendants' "expert" witness, 
Defendants never disputed the bills. The contract language is clear that the amount of the 
charges was to be the amount set forth in the billing statements. The contract as a whole 
is not ambiguous as to what was to be charged and accordingly no parole evidence should 
have been accepted. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S REQUIREMENT OF DETAILED BILLINGS WAS 
INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The Defendants argue that, because the contract was ambiguous the trial court 
needed to make a finding of reasonableness and necessity for the fees charged and 
services performed. The essential problem with this bold statement is that it fails to 
address how that reasonableness and necessity is determined. There must be some 
standard by which those items are measured. It cannot simply be the court's decision in a 
vacuum. 
If we do not allow the market place to determine the rate and reasonableness. (In 
this case this would be the acceptance of the invoices and the work product delivered to 
the Defendants). Then clearly the standards should be defined by the applicable standards 
in the industry in which the Plaintiff is a part. 
Mr. Barker testified that his billing methodologies and the method in which he 
performed his services were in compliance with the guidelines issued by the IRS and the 
AICPA. 
As set forth in detail in Plaintiffs initial brief and more briefly below, Mr. 
Prescott, Defendants' "expert" testified that nothing in the services performed by the 
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Company were against the standards of the IRS or the AICPA. He simply testified that he 
would have done the work differently. 
Prescott also testified that the types of bills submitted by the Plaintiff were not in 
violation of industry or community standards. 
Q. With respect to bills that are sent - you've testified that you're aware of 
standard billing practices for CPAs in this market, correct? 
A. Yes. 
A. So the question is do you itemize everything that's done for every service 
performed on the invoice itself, is that your question? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, that's not always done. 
Q. And in fact with respect to the firm that you work for, that's not always 
done, would that be true? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Is it your testimony that it would be a violation of the standards of the 
AICPA to not put that detail on the bill? 
A. No. 
R.436pgs.422-423. 
If the Court examines the listed entries for the CPA's in the Defendants' 
memorandum of costs, it is readily apparent that Mr. Prescott and his firm provide no 
more detail than that which they castigate Mr. Barker for. 
If the Trial Court is going to use some "reasonable and necessary" standard to 
rewrite the agreement between the parties it must be based on some standard. Since the 
work and bills were provided in accordance with industry standards, they should have 
been accepted by the Court. 
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II. DALE K. BARKER CO. P.C. vs. JOHN K. BUSHNELL 
A. BUSHNELL BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
Defendants frame the dispute before the Court as how much Bushnell was 
obligated to pay for the services rendered to him, and whether he paid them. The trial 
court ruled that there was no evidence that the amount paid was not equivalent to the 
amount owed. This ruling is not supported by the evidence. 
1. Damages according to the Company's Evidence. 
The contract between Bushnell and the Company established what the Company 
was to be paid for the services it was performing. Paragraph 2 of the contract states, in 
pertinent part: 
2. Fees. 
(a.) Rate. As compensation for all services (including Telephone Conferences) 
rendered by Barker pursuant to this agreement, Client shall pay to Barker on the 
terms and conditions contained herein; fees on a project by project basis... 
2.Payment of Fees. 
(a.) Time. Barker shall issue periodic billing statements to Client on or about the 
first of each month. Client shall pay any and all fees due hereunder within fifteen 
(15) days of the date of each such billing statement. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, admitted at trial, sets forth a total amount incurred by 
Bushnell for the work performed on his behalf of $19,000.00 with total payments of 
$2,180.00. This left a balance owing of $16,820.00. Mr. Barker testified that the charges 
made were for the work performed, and that they were reasonable and necessary. 
It was undisputed that Bushnell was sent monthly statements detailing the 
charges that were incurred. It is likewise undisputed that Bushnell never objected to the 
charges until years after the work was performed. In fact Bushnell affirmed his 
acceptance of the fees. 
Plaintiff introduced as Exhibits 66 through 74 a series of letters which were 
prepared by the Company and signed by Bushnell. The letters were dated between 
August 31, 2005 and September 15, 2005. Each of the letters refers specifically to an 
individual tax year. Each letter states that Bushnell accepts the work performed to that 
date and acknowledges receipt of the billing for that work. Each statement likewise 
acknowledges BushnelPs responsibility for those payments. 
At the close of Plaintiff s case, Bushnell made a motion for a directed verdict. The 
Trial Court denied Bushnell's motion and found that the testimony of Mr. Barker coupled 
with the invoices constituted sufficient evidence to establish the fees charged and services 
rendered were performed, necessary and reasonable. R.435 pg. 318 1. 24-25, pg 319 1. 1-
15. If the Court were to accept the evidence presented, by Mr. Barker, Bushnell had 
failed to pay $16, 820.00 and was clearly in breach of the contract. 
2. Damages according to Bushnell's evidence. 
Plaintiff believes that the contract coupled with the invoices and acceptance of 
those invoices resolves any alleged ambiguity in the amount owed by Bushnell. Bushnell 
argues that the contract is ambiguous with respect to what he was required to pay and 
accordingly the services should be paid for on a "reasonable and necessary standard". If 
we accept this premise as true, the evidence still does not support the Trial Court's ruling. 
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As set forth above, the Trial Court entered a ruling at the close of Plaintiff s case 
that the fees charged were proven, reasonable, and necessary. The Court's change of 
heart had therefore to be dependent on contrary evidence. The only purportedly 
competent evidence to the contrary would have had to be produced by Bushnell's 
"expert" Keith Prescott. 
On cross examination Mr. Prescott admitted the rates charged for the work that 
was performed were reasonable and not excessive. Trial Transcript pg 431 (R.436). Mr. 
Prescott also admitted that the charges for preparing the tax returns for Bushnell were not 
excessive. Trial Transcript pg. 431 (R.436). 
Finding of Fact #22 states "On August 30, 2005 and September 1, 2005, Barker 
prepared Mr. BushnelPs tax returns for the years 1998 through 2003." R.463. on Cross 
Examination Mr. Prescott was asked about the reasonableness of the fees as follows: 
"Q. And isn't it true that you have stated under oath that the fees up to the time the 
tax returns were prepared were not excessive? 
A. Yes, it is." Trial Transcript pg. 431 (R.463). 
Mr. Prescott testified that his rate in 2005 was $205 per hour. Trial transcript pg. 
431. Presumptively, Mr. Prescott believes that fee to be reasonable. On cross examination 
Mr. Prescott testified that a reasonable number of hours, just for the preparation of the tax 
returns for Mr. Bushnell would have been 88 hours. Trial Transcript pg 435 (R.436). 
Multiplying Mr. Prescott's "reasonable" rate by the number of hours gives a total of 
$18,040.00 as reasonable compensation for the preparation of the tax returns. This does 
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not include the additional charges and fees for dealing with the IRS. 
The total amount billed for all services, including the negotiations with the IRS 
was only $19,000.00. There is absolutely no evidence that the value of the services 
performed was only $2,180.00. The finding of the Court was clearly erroneous and 
contrary to the evidence presented. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND A BREACH OF 
CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY. 
1. The Trial Court Violated the Company's Due Process Rights. 
Bushnell filed a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff. Bushnet did not. At the close 
of evidence, Plaintiff made a motion under Rule 41 for dismissal of Bushnell's 
counterclaim. The counterclaim consisted of two causes of action, one for negligence, 
and one for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the claim for negligence, but 
denied the motion as to the breach of contract claim. In his breach of contract claim 
Bushnell had asserted a number of basis for the alleged breach. The trial court ruled 
against all of the alleged breaches except one. The trial court identified that the only issue 
that survived the Rule 41 motion was "whether the contract has been breached because 
Mr. Barker has in an unprofessional manner, unnecessary unreasonably did this 
compilation." Trial transcript pg. 705 (R.437). 
The initial problem with this ruling is that the sole purported remaining claim had 
nothing to do with Bushnell. The compilation at issue was reflected solely in the Bushnet 
billings. As a matter of law therefore, the entire counterclaim should have been 
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dismissed. This would have cured the forthcoming deficiencies. 
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law four other basis, for the alleged 
breach of contract, are set forth. These include #20 Mr. Barker did not file Mr. Bushnell's 
tax returns by the date agreed upon with the IRS agent, #24 the tax return for 1999 
contained an error where it under reported income by $45,000.00, #25 the tax return for 
the year 2004 contained an error where it classified Bushnet as a subchapter S 
corporation, #30 Barker counseled Bushnell not to pay the amounts owing until a fee 
abatement could be requested, and that due to nonpayment of the amounts owing federal 
tax liens were filed for the years 1998, 2000 and 2003. R.463-464. 
These bases were challenged by the Plaintiff in his Rule 41 motion and dismissed. 
The subsequent inclusion of these items in the findings of fact and conclusion of law are 
therefore plain error. 
No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that claims 
allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not be deprived of 
his property without first being afforded due process of law. This guarantee is 
enshrined in both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. That due process of law is owed 
in every instance is a self-evident proposition. Measuring the amount of process 
that is due in any particular setting is more difficult. Nevertheless, "[w]e long ago 
succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due process, observing that it 
requires that notice be given to the person whose rights [***19] are to be affected. 
It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only 
after trial." Pangea Techs.. Inc. v. Internet Promotions. Inc.* 2004 UT 40, P 8, 94 
P.3d 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). The bare essentials of due process 
thus mandate adequate notice to those with an interest in the matter and an 
opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner. See Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, P 68. 100 P.3d 1177. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc.f 156 P.3d 782, 787 (Utah 2007). 
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Plaintiff truncated its rebuttal in this matter based on the Court's Rule 41 ruling. 
To resurrect these items after the dismissal without notice and opportunity for rebuttal 
deprives the Plaintiff of due process by denying it the opportunity to adequately rebut 
these claims. 
If these bases are stricken only the claim that the compilation was unnecessary 
survived and since that argument was incorrect and in any event not applicable to this 
Defendant, the claim is without merit. 
2. Performing The Compilation Does Not Constitute A Breach Of Contract. 
Setting aside the fact that the compilation does not relate to Bushnell, if the trial 
court had limited itself to the stated only surviving claim, there was no breach of contract 
as a matter of law. 
In their brief, the Defendants argue that the preparation of the compilation was 
unnecessary. Indeed, the trial court agreed with this argument. While the Plaintiff 
disagrees with this finding and argument, if we were to assume arguendo that it were 
true, this still does not constitute a breach of the contract by the Plaintiff. 
As set forth in Plaintiffs initial brief, there is no evidence that states the creation 
of a compilation is inappropriate when preparing tax returns. The Plaintiff is governed by 
the standards of the American Institute for Certified Pubiic Accountants (AICPA). There 
was no testimony that creation of the compilation violated those standards. Indeed on 
cross-examination, Defendants' "expert" witness testified that creating the compilation 
was not a violation of the AICPA rules. 
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The determination of what is necessary for the rendering of the services, under the 
contract, is left to the discretion of the Company. It was patently inappropriate for the 
trial court to modify the contract by substituting its judgment as to what is necessary 
without reference to the standards of the industry, likewise Prescott's opinion that he 
would have performed the work in a different manner is irrelevant, because it was not 
based on industry standards but only on personal choice. 
3. The Additional Alleged Breaches Fail To State A Claim As A Matter Of 
Law. 
If the Court does address the items dismissed in the Rule 41 Motion, they fail to 
state a claim for relief as a matter of law. "The elements of a prima facie case for breach 
of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach 
of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages. See Nuttall v. Berntson, 83 Utah 535, 
543, 30 P.2d 738. 741 (1934)." Bair v. Axim Design, L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 
2001). 
The first element is clearly met. There is no dispute the parties have a contract. As 
demonstrated above, Bushnell does not meet the second criteria as he failed to pay for the 
services rendered. The third requirement likewise fails. 
The first asserted item of breach was a failure to file the tax returns by the date 
agreed to with the IRS agent. Nothing in the contract specified the time any of the returns 
had to be filed with the IRS. Indeed, the returns were already past their due dates before 
Mr. Bushnell approached Mr. Barker for representation. Mr. Barker testified that attempts 
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to contact the IRS agent for clarification as to how the returns were to be delivered were 
unsuccessful as the agent was out of town. When she was finally reached the returns were 
filed in accordance with her instructions. Because the contract did not specify the work 
was to be performed in any specific fashion, there was no duty and therefore there could 
be no breach. The second asserted breach was the under reporting of income in the 1999 
return. Mr. Barker admitted there was an error on this return. The filing of the return with 
an error on it is not however a breach of the contract between the parties. Nothing in the 
contract provides that the work will be 100% accurate. In order for an error to constitute a 
breach it must be of such significance that it otherwise renders the contract violated. In 
other words it must be material. The error in question was not discovered until after 
Bushnell terminated Plaintiffs representation. The remedy however would simply have 
involved filing a one page amended return document. 
The third claim is that Bushnet was filed as a subchapter S corporation in error. As 
stated in Plaintiffs initial memo, if there were a claim here it would belong to Bushnet, 
not Bushnell. Since Bushnet did not file a counterclaim the point is moot. Second, the 
testimony was that the decision to file the S corporation return was discussed by Mr. 
Barker and Bushnell prior to its taking place, and the parties agreed to file the return first 
and to subsequently file the S corp. election. Rather than being a breach, the filing of the 
S Corp return was completely in compliance with the agreement of the parties 
The final claimed basis of breach was advising Bushnell not to pay the taxes 
owing until such time as the interest and penalties were calculated. As set forth in 
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Plaintiffs initial brief, there was plenty of testimony to show this was not true. If 
however we assume it was true, the finding still begs the question of how this alleged 
advice breached the contract between the Plaintiff and Bushnell. The Plaintiff made its 
recommendations to Bushnell based on its experience with the IRS and the information 
provided by Bushnell. There was no evidence presented of any AICPA standard that was 
breached by giving the alleged advice. Where the information provided by Bushnell was 
inaccurate or the IRS acted in a way contrary to Plaintiffs past experience, there was no 
breach of any contractual provision by the Plaintiff. 
The final element for a breach of contract is a finding of damage. The Court 
explicitly found that Bushnell had not proved any damages, but awarded nominal 
damages. There was no evidence presented at trial that causally linked the alleged 
breaches of the Plaintiff with any actual damage suffered by Bushnell. Where there was 
no such evidence, it was clearly inappropriate to award even nominal damages. The cause 
of action should have failed based on the failure of the Counterclaimant to meet its 
burden of proof in meeting this final element. 
III. DALE K. BARKER CO. P.C. vs. BUSHNET, INC. 
A. BUSHNET BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Statements and bills for Bushnet, P.C. were contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
#5. The Statement shows total invoices of $45,355.20 and corresponding payments of 
$30,320.00. This is a little misleading however as $12, 680.20 was simply reimbursement 
for the taxes owed by Bushnell paid by Dale K. Barker Co. P.C. on behalf of Bushnell. 
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The actual fees for services were therefore $32,675.00 and actual payments against that 
amount were $17,639.80. 
Just as with the Bushnell fees the Trial Court made a finding, at the close of 
Plaintiffs case, that Plaintiff had made the necessary prima facie showings of necessity 
and reasonableness. So at least at that point Plaintiff had proven damages of $17,639.80. 
The Defendants challenged the reasonableness of the fees being charged on two 
basis (1) that the compilation was unnecessary and (2) that the general category of 
"research, conferences, meeting, etc." failed to provide enough detail for the court to 
determine the reasonableness and necessity of the work being performed and the charges 
for it. 
Since the evidence had been deemed sufficient at the close of Plaintiff s case, we 
are required to look at what "evidence" the Defendants produced in their case to change 
the Court's mind. The only "evidence" was the testimony of Prescott. 
On cross examination Mr. Prescott stated he had not rendered an opinion in his 
expert report relating to the reasonableness of the hours spent on the Bushnet returns. 
R.436 pg. 435. He did opine however that he believed the compilation of the Bushnet 
records was unnecessary as part of the return preparation. R.436 pg 436. Mr. Prescott's 
"opinion" was based on his slanted testimony at trial. The evidence focused on finding 
some numbers in the Quicken data that matched or came close to the numbers in the tax 
returns. They ignored, and the Trial Court ignored the glaring inaccuracies contained 
elsewhere in the data and set forth in Plaintiffs initial brief. 
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Mr. Prescott testified that the preparation of a compilation in connection with a tax 
return did not violate any AICPA rule respecting how a tax return was supposed to be 
prepared. R.436 pg 436. Mr. Prescotf s opinion that the compilation was not necessary 
was simply his personal opinion, bought and paid for, not one founded in any generally 
accepted rule of any organized body governing tax practice or certified public 
accountants. Where an "expert" testifies and his opinion is basically speculation a trial 
court can strike the expert's opinion from the record. Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 
339 (Utah 1996). Prescott's testimony should have been disregarded, and the requested 
damages awarded. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT OVER ASSESSED THE COSTS AND FEES 
AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FEES WAS EXCESSIVE. 
In their brief the Defendants admit that some of their requested fees are improper. 
They seek to justify the balance of the fees on the basis that had Plaintiff prevailed it 
would have claimed entitlement to fees higher than the legal fees requested. What the 
Plaintiff would have sought in costs, which undoubtedly would have been objected to, 
cannot be the basis for justification of Defendants' fees. 
It is undisputable that Bushnell lost one half of his counterclaim and all of his third 
party complaint. In spite of this Bushnell failed to separate out fees from those claims 
which he won from those he lost. The burden to do so was his, not the Plaintiffs or the 
Court's. Utah Courts have found that a failure to separate out such costs can be reason 
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enough for denial of all attorney fees. Mountain States Broad Co. vs. Neele, 783 P. 2d 
557, 556 (Utah Apt. 1989). 
A review of Mr. Moss's declaration clearly discloses the request for some fees that 
related solely to the third-party complaint and there are other entries that appear to be 
blends of clearly inappropriate fees with other fees. It was the duty of the defendant to 
separate those fees, not the duty of the plaintiff to have to hunt and peck through the 
voluminous general entries made by the plaintiff in an attempt to decide what fees were 
being charged. 
Bushnell elected to have two counsels present for virtually all depositions, for the 
entire trial of this matter, and for post trial meetings and hearings. While taken 
individually the billing rate of individual attorneys are probably within the reasonable 
range of attorney's in this market, the combined rate is excessive, and that is the rate that 
in essence the court awarded. The only response to this argument is that the attorney 
fees were not as much as the costs the Company would have requested. This fails to 
address the issue at all. The argument is that the fees become unreasonable in amount 
when you stack multiple attorneys on simple issues. 
In their brief the Defendants fail to address the recent Utah Court of Appeals 
decision Stonecreek Landscaping vs. Bell 2008 UT APP 144 (Utah App. 04/24/2008). 
R.347-352. The factors in this case are remarkably similar in that the matter was 
relatively simple and the Defendants failed to prevail on many of their claims and on the 
counterclaim received only nominal damages. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS WAS EXCESSIVE. 
Bushnell originally requested costs including expert witness fees in the amount of 
$17,450.65. He then claimed that amount was in error and requested expert witness fees 
in the amount of $25,188.45. The trial court ended up awarding $32,013.20. 
In its initial brief the Plaintiff showed the costs awarded included expert witness 
fees for individuals never called as witnesses and indeed never timely identified as 
potential expert witnesses. If they could not have participated at trial, why is Plaintiff 
being stuck with their fees for preparing to do so? 
Again the only supposed response from the Defendants is to state that the 
Plaintiff would have charged more. This is clearly not a supportable defense, and 
because the claimed costs are so egregiously exaggerated it would be appropriate to strike 
all awarded costs in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' brief dwells almost entirely on the concept that the contract between 
the parties was ambiguous and accordingly the trial court had the right and responsibility 
to rewrite the contract on the basis of "reasonableness and necessity". They have however 
failed to define or to show how the court defined either reasonableness or necessity. 
Under any objective standard the work performed and the charges made therefore by the 
Plaintiff meet a community and professional standard of reasonableness and necessity. It 
is only based on a subjective standard, using unknown parameters, and ignoring the actual 
evidence in the case, that a claim can be made the trial court's rulings should be upheld. 
19 
After marshaling all of the evidence and examining the legal issues it is clear that the trial 
court's rulings are supportable in neither fact nor the law and Plaintiff respectfully 
requests the judgments be overturned and Plaintiff be awarded the damages as prayed for 
in its original complaint. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 2009 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
^—J. 
Shawn D. Turner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8 day of May, 2009 a true and correct copy of Brief 
of Appellant was hand delivered, to the following: 
David P. Hirschi 
Brennan Moss 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Ste. 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
•*— . / - L 
20 
